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_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Robert John Kulick pled guilty to one count of 
unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  The United States 
Probation Office assigned Kulick a base offense level of 23 
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(“Guidelines”), by cross-referencing a dismissed charge for 
extortion.  Kulick raises two arguments on appeal.  First, he 
contends that the District Court‟s application of the cross-
reference in § 2K2.1(c)(1) of the Guidelines, resulting in an 
increased base offense level and sentence, was improper.  
Second, he argues that the District Court did not adequately 
explain its reasons for denying a downward departure or 
variance.  For the reasons stated herein, we will vacate 
Kulick‟s sentence and remand for resentencing.  Specifically, 
we hold that the extortion count was not relevant conduct to 
the unlawful possession of a firearm count, and therefore the 
cross-reference was improperly applied. 
I. 
 On April 23, 2008, a grand jury returned a four-count 
indictment against Kulick.  Count One involved conduct 
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occurring on March 6, 2008.  It charged Kulick with being a 
felon in possession of six firearms, including a Beretta semi-
automatic pistol, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 
924(a)(2).  Counts Two through Four all charged Kulick for 
conduct occurring in December 2005.  Specifically, Count 
Two charged him with being a felon in possession of a 
Beretta semi-automatic pistol, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 922(g), 924(a)(2).
1
  Count Three charged him with using, 
carrying, and brandishing a firearm, during, in relation to, and 
in furtherance of a crime of extortion, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).  Count Four charged him with obstructing 
interstate commerce through extortion, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1951, by threatening an employee with a Beretta 
semi-automatic pistol. 
 On November 14, 2008, Kulick pled guilty to Count 
One, unlawful possession of a firearm.  As part of his plea 
agreement, the government agreed to move for dismissal of 
the remaining counts, including the extortion count.  Kulick 
was sentenced on September 15, 2009 under the 2008 edition 
of the Guidelines. 
 The United States Probation Office prepared a 
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”).  The PSR 
                                                 
1
 Counts One and Two were based on Kulick‟s 1988 
conviction for attempting to evade or defeat personal income 
tax, a felony in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201.  As a result of 
this conviction, federal law barred him from possessing a 
firearm.  See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 
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calculated Kulick‟s base offense level at 23 and his criminal 
history category at I, yielding a recommended imprisonment 
range of 46-57 months.  The PSR applied the cross-reference 
provision and used the guideline for extortion, rather than 
unlawful possession of a firearm, to determine the base 
offense level.  It applied the cross-reference on the basis that 
the extortion was relevant conduct to the unlawful possession 
of a firearm offense.
2
  Importantly, extortion had a base 
offense level of 23 (46-57 months), whereas unlawful 
possession of a firearm had a base offense level of 19 (30-37 
months). 
 Kulick made two main arguments at the sentencing 
hearing, both of which were rejected by the District Court.  
First, Kulick objected to the PSR guideline calculation.  He 
argued that the PSR incorrectly applied the cross-reference at 
§ 2K2.1(c)(1), thereby increasing the base offense level to 23.  
Specifically, Kulick argued that the cross-reference was 
                                                 
2
 The fact that the extortion offense was dismissed 
pursuant to the plea agreement did not preclude it from being 
offered as relevant conduct at sentencing.  United States v. 
Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 863 (3d Cir. 1997); see also United 
States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1481 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[I]t is well 
settled . . . that conduct forming the basis for counts 
dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement may be considered in 
determining a defendant‟s base offense level under the 
Sentencing Guidelines.”).  Moreover, it was not necessary to 
prove extortion beyond a reasonable doubt in order for it to be 
considered for enhancement at sentencing.  United States v. 
Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
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inapplicable because of the temporal disconnect between the 
two crimes.  The extortion offense occurred in 2005, while 
the unlawful possession of a firearm offense occurred in 
2008.  The government conceded the merit of Kulick‟s 
argument, and stated: 
 I would have to say when you look at the 
two cases cited by [Kulick], he has a very 
strong argument because the gun was not being 
used to extort the employee at the time the gun 
was seized.  Over a year had passed since that 
incident. 
 If the Court finds that the cross reference 
should not be applied, I think the defense would 
agree that the Court may still consider the 
incident as in the sense that it is relevant 
conduct.  It shows the overall conduct of 
[Kulick]. 
 It is the same weapon as the one seized.  
The seizures occurred in the same office where 
the extortion took place, and therefore, the 
Court may consider it, but not as a cross 
reference. 
(App. at 79-80.)  Despite the government‟s concession, the 
District Court adopted the PSR‟s approach and applied the 
cross-reference to enhance the base offense level to 23. 
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 Second, Kulick argued that his record of charitable 
contributions and post-arrest alcohol treatment were 
mitigating factors counseling in favor of a downward 
departure or variance.  Specifically, Kulick argued that he had 
undertaken alcohol abuse treatment immediately following 
his arrest and that he had donated approximately $125,000 to 
six local charitable organizations in the past five years.  The 
District Court stated that it had taken into consideration all of 
Kulick‟s arguments and specifically referenced Kulick‟s 
alcohol treatment.  Nevertheless, it refused to grant a 
downward variance or departure. 
 The District Court adopted the PSR in full.  It 
concluded that the total offense level was 23, the criminal 
history category was I, and the recommended imprisonment 
range was 46-57 months.  The government requested that the 
District Court depart downward two levels, to level 21,
3
 and 
the court followed this recommendation.  The imprisonment 
range was reduced to 37-46 months, and the District Court 
sentenced Kulick to 37 months‟ imprisonment. 
 Kulick timely appealed. 
II. 
                                                 
3
 U.S.S.G. § 5K1 provides that the government may 
move for the court to depart from the Guidelines when a 
defendant has provided substantial assistance in the 
investigation or prosecution of another person who has 
committed an offense. 
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 The United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 Our review of the District Court‟s interpretation and 
construction of the Guidelines is plenary.  United States v. 
Pena, 268 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Cohen, 171 F.3d 796, 802 (3d Cir. 1999).  We review the 
District Court‟s “factual findings in determining whether the 
offenses charged were part of one overall scheme or a 
continuing course of criminal conduct . . . for clear error.”  
United States v. Randolph, 137 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1998); 
see also United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 
2008).  “A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing body on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed.”  Wise, 515 F.3d at 218 (internal 
citations omitted). 
 Appellate review of a sentence is for abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 243 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 
(2007)).  First, we review the District Court‟s order to assure 
that there was no significant procedural error, such as failing 
to consider the § 3553(a) factors.  Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.  
Second, we consider the substantive reasonableness of the 
sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  Id. 
III. 
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 Kulick raises two arguments on appeal.  First, he 
argues that the extortion offense was not relevant conduct to 
the unlawful possession of a firearm offense and that, 
therefore, the cross-reference was improperly applied.  
Second, he argues that the District Court did not adequately 
explain its decision not to depart or vary downward.  We will 
address each contention in turn. 
A.  Chapter Two Cross-References. 
 Section 2K2.1 set the base offense level for Kulick‟s 
unlawful possession of a firearm offense at 19.  Its cross-
reference provision, however, authorized the District Court to 
set the base offense level higher by cross-referencing another 
offense: 
[i]f the defendant used or possessed any firearm 
or ammunition in connection with the 
commission or attempted commission of 
another offense, or possessed or transferred a 
firearm or ammunition with knowledge or intent 
that it would be used or possessed in connection 
with another offense, apply . . . §2X1.1 
(Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy) in respect 
to that other offense, if the resulting offense 
level is greater than that determined above . . . 
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1).  Before determining whether 
extortion may be cross-referenced under § 2K2.1(c)(1), we 
must first address two issues.  First, is cross-referenced 
conduct limited to relevant conduct?  Second, if yes, is 
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extortion relevant conduct to unlawful possession of a 
firearm? 
1.  Whether § 2K2.1(c)(1) is limited by § 1B1.3. 
 A split has developed among our sister courts of 
appeals regarding whether a cross-referenced offense in 
§ 2K2.1(c)(1) must be within the relevant conduct of the 
charged offense.  In other words: is § 2K2.1(c)(1) limited to 
relevant conduct as defined in § 1B1.3 of the Guidelines?  We 
have not yet weighed in, but we do so now and hold that 
cross-referenced conduct under § 2K2.1(c)(1) must be 
relevant conduct. 
 Section 1B1.3 defines relevant conduct and provides a 
general rule of construction for Chapter Two cross-
references.  It explicitly states that “[u]nless otherwise 
specified, . . . (iii) cross references in Chapter Two . . . shall 
be determined on the basis of the following [definitions of 
relevant conduct].”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a).  Thus, § 1B1.3(a) is 
“a general application principle that governs both cross-
references in Chapter Two offense guidelines and offense 
level adjustments in Chapter Three, provided those sections 
do not specify to the contrary.”  United States v. Ritsema, 31 
F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 1994).  Because it is a general 
principle, the commentary to § 1B1.3 clarifies that cross-
references are always limited to relevant conduct unless there 
are “more explicit instructions.”  § 1B1.3, cmt. backg‟d.  The 
general language of § 2K2.1(c)(1) does not constitute an 
explicit instruction to take a different approach.  Accordingly, 
courts of appeals to reach this issue, with the exception of the 
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, have 
held that § 2K2.1(c)(1) is limited by § 1B1.3 to relevant 
conduct.  See, e.g., United States v. Settle, 414 F.3d 629, 633-
34 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 767, 
771-72 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Jardine, 364 F.3d 
1200, 1209 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Mann, 315 F.3d 
1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Jones, 313 F.3d 
1019, 1022 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 The Fifth Circuit is the only court of appeals to have 
held that § 1B1.3 does not restrict the application of 
§ 2K2.1(c)(1).  In United States v. Gonzales, the Fifth Circuit 
reasoned that § 2K2.1(c)(1)‟s “unlimited references to 
„another offense,‟ indicate[] that it [the offense] is not 
restricted to offenses which would be relevant conduct but 
embraces all illegal conduct performed or intended by [the] 
defendant concerning a firearm involved in the charged 
offense.”  996 F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir. 1993).   Therefore, the 
court held that, as long as the same firearm was used, any 
offense committed with that firearm may be cross-referenced 
regardless of whether it was relevant conduct. 
 We join the majority of our sister courts of appeals and 
hold that § 2K2.1(c)(1) cross-referenced conduct must be 
relevant conduct under § 1B1.3.  Section 2K2.1(c)(1) does 
not explicitly specify an alternative approach to the general 
rule of construction provided in § 1B1.3.  The “mere 
reference to „another offense‟ does not resolve the question of 
whether the other offense must be within the relevant conduct 
of the charged offense.”  Williams, 431 F.3d at 772.  
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Therefore, § 1B1.3 limits cross-references in § 2K2.1(c)(1) to 
relevant conduct. 
2.  Whether extortion was relevant 
conduct under 1B1.3(a)(2). 
 The District Court concluded that extortion was 
relevant conduct to the unlawful possession of a firearm 
offense, but it did not clarify whether it was relevant conduct 
under §§ 1B1.3(a)(1) or (a)(2).  Both parties suggest that 
§ 1B1.3(a)(2) applies here.  Relevant conduct is defined in 
§ 1B1.3(a) as: 
(1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, 
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, 
procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; 
and  
(B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal 
activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or 
enterprise undertaken by the defendant in 
concert with others, whether or not charged as a 
conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and 
omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly 
undertaken criminal activity, that occurred 
during the commission of the offense of 
conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in 
the course of attempting to avoid detection or 
responsibility for that offense. 
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(2) solely with respect to offenses of a character 
for which § 3D1.2(d) would require grouping of 
multiple counts, all acts and omissions 
described in subdivisions (1)(A) and (1)(B) 
above that were part of the same course of 
conduct or common scheme or plan as the 
offense of conviction. 
(3) all harm that resulted from the acts and 
omissions specified in subsections (a)(1) and 
(a)(2) above, and all harm that was the object of 
such acts and omissions. 
§ 1B1.3(a). 
 In Jansen v. United States, 369 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir. 
2004), we established a general rule for determining whether 
§§ 1B1.3(a)(1) or (a)(2) applies to certain conduct.  We held 
that if both sections could apply to the facts of a case, we 
must apply Section (a)(2).  Id. at 247-48.  Moreover, we held 
that Section (a)(2) applies “when the offense of conviction is 
a groupable offense, regardless of the nature of the alleged 
relevant conduct.” 4  Id. at 248.  Kulick‟s offense of 
                                                 
4
 We note that not every court of appeals agrees with 
our interpretation of § 1B1.3(a)(2).  We apply Section (a)(2) 
when only the offense of conviction is a groupable offense, 
rather than requiring both the offense of conviction as well as 
the relevant offense to be groupable offenses.  Jansen v. 
United States, 369 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir. 2004).  Several 
courts of appeals disagree with our rationale and require both 
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conviction, unlawful possession of a firearm, is a groupable 
offense.
5
  See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d).  Accordingly, we apply 
Section (a)(2) to determine whether extortion was relevant 
conduct to Kulick‟s unlawful possession of a firearm. 
 For an act to qualify as relevant conduct under 
§ 1B1.3(a)(2), three conditions must be met:  “(1) it must be 
                                                                                                             
the convicted offense and the relevant conduct offense to be 
capable of grouping under § 3D1.2(d) in order for Section 
(a)(2) to apply.  See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 
767, 772 n.9 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gill, 348 F.3d 
147, 153 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Wyss, 147 F.3d 631, 
632 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 
If we were not bound by Jansen, an argument might be 
made that we should not apply Section (a)(2) on these facts, 
which pertain to firearm offenses rather than drug offenses.  
Nonetheless, we are bound by our precedent and will 
therefore apply Section (a)(2).  In any event, we leave for 
another day whether to recommend en banc consideration of 
whether Jansen‟s effect should be limited to drug offenses or 
to those cases in which the offense of conviction has a higher 
offense level than the alleged relevant conduct. 
 
5
 Section 3D1.2(d) of the Guidelines defines groupable 
offenses.  Felon-in-possession offenses are among those 
specifically listed as groupable.  Although extortion is 
explicitly listed as an offense that may not be grouped under § 
3D1.2(d), we only look to the offense of conviction under 
Jansen. 
  
15 
 
the type of conduct described in § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) and (B) 
(„all acts and omissions committed . . . by the defendant‟); 
(2) grouping would be appropriate under § 3D1.2(d); and 
(3) it must have been „part of the same course of conduct or 
common scheme or plan‟ under § 1B1.3(a)(2).”  United States 
v. Blackmon, 557 F.3d 113, 123 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 The first two conditions are easily satisfied.  In 
accordance with the District Court‟s findings and the text of 
§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), Kulick committed both offenses.  
Moreover, grouping is appropriate because unlawful 
possession of a firearm is a groupable offense under 
§ 3D1.2(d).  See Jansen, 369 F.3d at 248. 
 The third condition, whether the two offenses were 
part of the “same course of conduct” or “common scheme,” 
requires a more fact-intensive analysis and is the main issue 
here.  The Guidelines‟ commentary defines the “same course 
of conduct” as those offenses that “are sufficiently connected 
or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they 
are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of 
offenses.”  § 1B1.3 cmt. n.9(B).  The commentary also 
defines a “common scheme or plan” as being at least two 
offenses that are “substantially connected to each other by at 
least one common factor, such as common victims, common 
accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus operandi.”  
Id. at cmt. n.9(A). 
 In order to determine whether offenses are part of the 
same course of conduct, and thus relevant conduct, the 
Guidelines‟ commentary provides a three-prong test.  The 
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sentencing court must look to:  (1) the temporal proximity 
between the two offenses; (2) the similarity of the offenses; 
and (3) the regularity of the offenses.  United States v. 
Wilson, 106 F.3d 1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting § 1B1.3, 
cmt. n.9(B)).  Importantly, the test is a sliding scale, so 
“[e]ven if one factor is absent,” relevant conduct may be 
found where at least one other factor is strong.  Id.  Therefore, 
“[a]lthough there is no bright-line rule defining what 
constitutes „the same course of conduct,‟” the relative 
strengths of the three prongs must be individually assessed.  
United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1484 (6th Cir. 1996).  
This factual determination is for the District Court to 
determine in the first instance, and we review for clear error.  
United States v. Harrison, 357 F.3d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 2004), 
vacated on other grounds.  Therefore, we turn to the three-
prong test to determine whether the District Court properly 
concluded that extortion was relevant conduct, bearing in 
mind that “[t]his test is especially important in cases where 
the extraneous conduct exists in „discrete, identifiable units‟ 
apart from the conduct for which the defendant is convicted.”  
United States v. Hahn, 960 F.2d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 1992). 
a.  Temporal Proximity 
 The time interval between Kulick‟s extortion offense 
and the unlawful possession of a firearm offense, twenty-
seven months, is substantial.
6
  We are wary to stretch the 
                                                 
6
 The temporal proximity prong measures the time that 
elapsed between the date of the two charged offenses.  Thus, 
although the government argues at other points that 
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limits of the temporal inquiry because § 1B1.3 “could not 
reasonably have been intended to cause a court to convert a 
single possession conviction into a sweeping tool to gather in 
all of the otherwise unrelated criminality of a defendant 
which occurred contemporaneously with the charge-offense.”  
Ritsema, 31 F.3d at 567.  Therefore, although the relevant 
conduct provision permits a sentencing court to consider 
events occurring before, during, and after the offense conduct, 
it is limited by temporal proximity to prevent “absurd results . 
. . especially in the context of possession crimes.”  Id. 
 Our sister courts of appeals have issued several 
opinions that are instructive to this inquiry.  As a general 
principle, “[v]arious courts have found that a period of 
separation of over one year negated or weighed against [a 
finding of] temporal proximity.”  United States v. Wall, 180 
F.3d 641, 646 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Hill, 79 F.3d at 1484.  
For example, in Hahn, the Ninth Circuit held that a five-
month gap between two offenses was “relatively remote” and 
would require a strong showing of similarity and regularity to 
constitute relevant conduct.  960 F.2d at 910-11.  Hahn was 
convicted of four counts related to the unlawful possession of 
a firearm and slightly less than one gram of 
methamphetamine.  The sentencing court adopted the PSR 
and considered evidence of Hahn‟s prior methamphetamine 
dealing and carrying of firearms spanning over a year prior to 
the offenses of conviction.  This year-old evidence was used 
                                                                                                             
possession of a gun is considered a “continuing offenses,” it 
concedes that twenty-seven months passed between the 
offenses.  (Red Br. at 24.) 
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as relevant conduct to greatly increase Hahn‟s sentence.  The 
Ninth Circuit held that there must be a “strong showing of 
substantial similarity” if the uncharged conduct is both 
solitary and temporally remote.  Hahn, 960 F.2d at 911.  It 
remanded the issue to the district court for consideration. 
 Over two years passed between Kulick‟s offense of 
conviction and the extortion offense.  The offenses were 
temporally remote, and as a general rule, “where the conduct 
alleged to be relevant is relatively remote to the offense of 
conviction, a stronger showing of similarity or regularity is 
necessary to compensate for the absence of temporal 
proximity.”  § 1B1.3 cmt. n.9(B).  With this in mind, we turn 
to the next two prongs. 
b.  Similarity 
 The similarity between the two offenses is also very 
weak, as there are significant differences between the 
offenses of extortion and unlawful possession of a firearm.  In 
evaluating this prong, a court primarily should consider the 
degree of similarity between the offenses, but can also look to 
the commonality of victims, the commonality of offenders, 
the commonality of purpose, and the similarity of modus 
operandi.  § 1B1.3 cmt. n.9(A), (B); see also Wilson, 106 
F.3d at 1144.  When “evaluating offenses under the similarity 
prong, a court must not do so at such „a level of generality 
that would render worthless the relevant conduct analysis.‟”  
Wilson, 106 F.3d at 1144 (quoting Hill, 79 F.3d at 1483).  
Therefore, 
  
19 
 
the acts in question must exhibit commonalities 
of factors sufficient to allow for a reasonable 
grouping of the separate, individual acts into a 
larger, descriptive whole.  It is not enough, 
however, that the acts stand in close temporal 
relation to one another.  Rather, the similarities 
of the acts must arise from the character or type 
of the acts. 
United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 865 (3d Cir. 1997). 
To find relevant conduct, we require a strong showing 
of similarity, even where the temporal proximity was strong.  
For example, we held that possession of drugs for personal 
use is too dissimilar, and therefore not relevant conduct, to 
possession of drugs with intent to distribute, even when the 
drugs were found contemporaneously.  Jansen, 369 F.3d at 
247.  Here, Kulick‟s offense of conviction was unlawful 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, while the 
allegedly-relevant conduct was extortion.  The two offenses 
are dissimilar, as the only commonality is the fact that 
possession of a gun is a required element of both charges. 
 The government mischaracterizes the similarity 
inquiry by arguing that the similarity prong is satisfied simply 
because Kulick used the same Beretta pistol in both offenses.  
In support of this proposition, the government relies on 
decisions issued by several courts of appeals, which found 
sufficient similarity where a defendant was charged with 
multiple counts of unlawful possession of a firearm.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Phillips, 516 F.3d 479 (6th Cir. 2008); 
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United States v. Brummett, 355 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Santoro, 159 F.3d 318 (7th Cir. 1998).  
However, these cases merely stand for the proposition that 
one count of unlawful possession of a firearm is similar to a 
second count of unlawful possession of a firearm, and is 
therefore relevant conduct.  For example, in Phillips, the 
Sixth Circuit upheld the district court‟s enhancement of the 
defendant‟s offense level for a 2004 unlawful possession of a 
firearm offense.  It found that the defendant‟s unlawful 
possession of firearms in 2002 and 2006 was relevant conduct 
to the offense of conviction.  516 F.3d at 483-85.  The court 
reasoned that “the contemporaneous, or nearly 
contemporaneous, possession of uncharged firearms is . . . 
relevant conduct in the context of a felon-in-possession 
prosecution.”  Id. at 483 (quoting United States v. Powell, 50 
F.3d 94, 104 (1st Cir. 1995)).  In so ruling, however, the court 
relied heavily on the fact that the offenses in 2002, 2004, and 
2006 were identical: unlawful possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon.  Id. at 485.  Moreover, the court reasoned 
that Phillips‟s repeated possession of firearms was for a 
common purpose: self-defense.  Id.; see also § 1B1.3, cmt. 
n.9(A) (encouraging sentencing courts to consider whether 
there is a common purpose for two or more offenses). 
 Similarly, in Brummett, 355 F.3d 343, the Fifth Circuit 
found relevant conduct where the defendant possessed four 
firearms on three separate occasions within a nine-month 
period.  In Santoro, 159 F.3d 318, the Seventh Circuit also 
held that the defendant‟s possession of an assault rifle, within 
six to nine months prior to his arrest for unlawful possession 
of a firearm, was part of a common course of conduct.  Both 
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Brummett and Santoro drew on a third case, United States v. 
Windle, for the proposition that a pattern of unlawfully 
possessing firearms over a relatively short period of time met 
the “same course of conduct requirement.”  74 F.3d 997, 
1000-01 (10th Cir. 1996).  None of these cases is applicable 
to the facts here, but instead merely establishes that unlawful 
possession of a firearm in one year may be relevant conduct 
to unlawful possession of a firearm in another year.  Kulick‟s 
case is readily distinguishable because the two counts are for 
different offenses, and there is no allegation or finding of a 
common purpose. 
c.  Regularity 
 The regularity inquiry, which considers the number of 
repetitions of the offenses, is not satisfied on these facts.  
§ 1B1.3(a)(2) cmt. n.9(B).  The government contends that 
even though extortion was an isolated occurrence, regularity 
is strong because possession of a firearm is a continuing 
offense.  See United States v. Hull, 456 F.3d 133, 146 (3d Cir. 
2006) (Ackerman, J., dissenting); see also United States v. 
Jackson, 479 F.3d 485, 491 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Blizzard, 27 F.3d 100, 102 (4th Cir. 1994).  In support of its 
argument, the government relies on a First Circuit decision, 
Powell, for the proposition that “the contemporaneous, or 
nearly contemporaneous, possession of uncharged firearms is, 
in this circuit, relevant conduct in the context of a felon-in-
possession prosecution.”  Powell, 50 F.3d at 104.  The 
sweeping language in Powell permitted the defendant‟s prior 
unlawful possession of a firearm to be relevant conduct for 
his underlying unlawful possession of a firearm conviction 
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offense.  It did not, however, permit an unrelated count to be 
relevant conduct solely because of the continuous possession 
of a firearm. 
 The District Court never explicitly found that Kulick 
possessed a Beretta pistol throughout the twenty-seven month 
period between the extortion and unlawful possession of a 
firearm offenses.  It suggested as much, however, by stating 
that Kulick “maintained control of the firearms, including a 
Beretta handgun, which according to witnesses he carried and 
at least on one occasion used to threaten an employee.”  (App. 
at 100.)  Kulick even conceded this point.  (Blue Br. at 16-17 
n.12, 25 n.21.)  Regardless of whether Kulick‟s possession 
was continuous for the entire twenty-seven months, we have 
never held that continuous possession of a firearm is 
sufficient to automatically render two offenses relevant 
conduct, and we decline to do so now. 
* * * 
 Kulick‟s extortion offense was not relevant conduct to 
his unlawful possession of a firearm because the time interval 
was considerable, there was very little similarity between the 
offenses, and there was no regularity.  Moreover, it would 
eviscerate the effect and import of the Guidelines to permit an 
enhancement on these facts.  When “illegal conduct does 
exist in „discrete, identifiable units‟ apart from the offense of 
conviction, the Guidelines anticipate a separate charge for 
such conduct.”  Hill, 79 F.3d at 1482 (quoting Hahn, 960 
F.2d at 909).  As the extortion offense is not relevant conduct 
under § 1B1.3(a)(2), the District Court committed clear error 
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by increasing Kulick‟s sentence through the § 2K2.1(c)(1) 
cross-reference.
7
 
                                                 
7
 The District Court was entitled to consider the 
extortion offense as related conduct warranting a variance 
from the guidelines under a § 3553(a) analysis.  Indeed, 
conduct that is in some way “related” to the offense conduct 
need not be “technically covered by the definition of relevant 
conduct” in order to be considered in a § 3553(a) analysis.  
Baird, 109 F.3d at 864. 
 
The government unpersuasively argues that the 
District Court was entitled to grant an enhancement if it found 
that extortion was merely related conduct, rather than relevant 
conduct.  It relies on our dicta in United States v. Harrison, 
357 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2004), for this proposition.  This 
argument fails for three reasons.  First, the District Court did 
not use the extortion offense as related conduct, but instead 
“adopt[ed] the reasoning of the probation officer that if the 
threat was made, 2B3.2 based on relevant conduct should 
apply.”  (App. at 80) (emphasis added).  Second, as discussed 
above, we hold that § 2K2.1(c)(1) cross-references are limited 
to relevant conduct under § 1B1.3.  Third, the government‟s 
broad reading of Harrison is inaccurate.  In Harrison, the 
defendant pled guilty to transporting child pornography in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1). The district court applied 
a two-level enhancement because “a computer was used for 
the transmission of the material.”  U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5).  
Based on the specific facts of that case, we held that the 
enhancement was properly applied because the conduct fell 
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B.  Variance and Departure 
 Although we have already determined that the District 
Court committed clear error by increasing Kulick‟s offense 
level through the § 2K2.1(c)(1) cross-reference, we consider 
nonetheless Kulick‟s second contention to provide guidance 
to the District Court on remand.  Kulick argued at sentencing 
that the District Court should grant either a downward 
departure or a variance from the Guidelines‟ range on the 
basis of his post-arrest alcohol treatment and long-term 
charitable contributions.  The District Court refused to grant 
the downward departure or variance and instead sentenced 
Kulick to a term of years at the low end of the imprisonment 
range.  Before this Court, Kulick argues that the District 
Court did not formally rule on the departure request or, in the 
alternative, did not adequately explain its decision not to vary 
downward under § 3553(a).  These arguments have little 
                                                                                                             
squarely within § 2G2.2(b)(5).  Id. at 319.  In dicta, we 
referenced Baird for the proposition that if a defendant pleads 
guilty to one offense, a lesser offense that is a necessary 
element of the larger offense may be related conduct, even if 
it does not fit the Guidelines definition in § 1B1.3.  Id. at 320.  
Accordingly, we noted that Harrison‟s downloads of 
pornography were related conduct because “[i]f Harrison had 
not downloaded the images, he could not have trafficked in 
them, and the two actions are therefore closely tied.”  Id.  The 
dicta in Harrison cannot properly be read to suggest that 
related conduct can always sustain an enhancement, and it 
does not do so here. 
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merit.  The record reveals that the District Court adequately 
explained its decision to stay within the Guidelines. 
 Kulick first argues that the District Court did not 
“formally rul[e] on the motions of both parties and stat[e] on 
the record whether [it was] granting a departure and how that 
departure affect[ed] the Guidelines calculation.”  United 
States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 2006)).  A 
close examination of the record reveals that Kulick‟s counsel 
actually requested a variance, rather than a departure: 
 I would like to move to -- I have touched 
on one, and this is probably more of a variance 
issue than a departure from the guidelines 
issue, and I think when the Court is looking at 
what is an appropriate sentence and when to 
apply the guidelines here, look at the real, true 
acceptance of responsibility that Mr. Kulick has 
undertaken here. 
 Part of the problems, past problems in 
Mr. Kulick‟s life are due to alcohol abuse and 
dependency.  This case, Your Honor, was a life-
changing event for Mr. Kulick. 
 Immediately after being arrested in this 
matter and released, Mr. Kulick undertook 
inpatient alcohol abuse treatment and therapy.  
He maintains on it.  I think you saw the letter 
that we have attached from Dr. Colangelo that 
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talked about how he has maintained his sobriety 
ever since this case started, and not only has he 
maintained that sobriety, but he has made it a 
point, as just mentioned to help out in any way 
possible.  That includes law enforcement.  That 
includes charitable involvement.  That includes 
a renewed commitment to his wife and two 
young children.  I think the Court should 
consider that in deciding whether this is a 
typical case. 
 Another ground for a variance, Your 
Honor, in addition to his alcohol rehabilitation 
and charitable works and the cooperation is this, 
is a very unusual felon in possession case. 
(App. at 84-85) (emphasis added).  Accordingly, the District 
Court properly treated the argument as a request for a 
variance rather than a departure.
8
 
 Kulick next argues that the District Court did not give 
sufficient justification for its decision not to vary downward 
under § 3553(a).  This argument also fails.  The District Court 
                                                 
8
 Even if Kulick had requested a departure, “[w]e do 
not have jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions by 
district courts to not depart downward . . . [unless] the district 
court‟s refusal to depart downward is based on the mistaken 
belief that it lacks discretion to do otherwise.”  Untied States 
v. Jones, 566 F.3d 353, 366 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United 
States v. Vargas, 477 F.3d 94, 103 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
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fully articulated the justification for Kulick‟s sentence.  It 
twice acknowledged Kulick‟s alcohol abuse treatment.  First, 
the court noted: “[t]he report that I have read is certainly 
detailed, together with the statements by Mr. Moran and Mr. 
Schwartz and yourself concerning with regard to [sic] 
rehabilitating yourself from the problem and the struggles you 
have with alcoholism.”  (App. at 99-100.)  Second, the court 
stated, “[Kulick] has a history of great struggle with alcohol, 
and he has done work at Clearbrook Manor and Father 
Martin‟s Ashley in Maryland, and he‟s under the care and 
counseling of Dr. Colangelo.”  (Id. at 101.)  Both of these 
statements reveal that the District Court actively considered 
Kulick‟s arguments for a downward variance based on his 
post-arrest alcohol treatment. 
 In contrast to Kulick‟s alcohol abuse treatment, it is 
unclear whether the District Court explicitly acknowledged 
Kulick‟s charitable contributions at sentencing.  The court 
ambiguously remarked that, “[Kulick] has a history of great 
struggle with alcohol, and he has done work at Clearbrook 
Manor and Father Martin‟s Ashley in Maryland, and he‟s 
under the care of Dr. Colangelo.”  (Id.) (emphasis added).  
Kulick argues that this statement was exclusively about his 
alcohol abuse treatment at Clearbrook Manor.  The 
government contends that this statement was also a passing 
reference to his charitable contributions to Clearbrook Manor.  
(See PSR Objection Letter, Feb. 24, 2009, p. 5.)  The fact that 
this is ambiguous, however, is not dispositive. 
 A “court need not discuss every argument made by a 
litigant if an argument is clearly without merit. . . . Nor must a 
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court discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) 
factors if the record makes clear the court took the factors into 
account in sentencing.”  United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 
324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006).  Even though the District Court did 
not explicitly and unambiguously reference the charitable 
contributions, we believe it did not ignore any of Kulick‟s 
arguments in favor of a downward variance. 
 Moreover, the Guidelines actually discourage a district 
court from considering a defendant‟s charitable contributions.  
According to § 5H1.11 of the Guidelines, charitable and 
“similar prior good works are not ordinarily relevant in 
determining whether a departure is warranted.”  U.S.S.G. 
§ 5H1.11.  Therefore, while a district court is not forbidden 
from considering the charitable contributions of a defendant, 
it must find “that this factor existed to an exceptional degree 
or, in some way, that makes the case different from the 
ordinary case in which the factor is present.”  United States v. 
Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 772 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal citations 
omitted) (upholding departure based on extraordinary 
charitable activity evidenced by numerous letters from 
personal beneficiaries).  Thus, the District Court had 
substantial discretion to decide the appropriate weight, if any, 
to give to evidence of Kulick‟s charitable donations.  Id.  The 
District Court reasonably concluded that the charitable 
contributions should be given little to no weight. 
 The remainder of the District Court‟s sentence 
explained the reasons that the court did not believe a 
downward variance was warranted.  The court noted that 
Kulick had “been in contact with the law on numerous 
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occasions,” came “from a better background, and should have 
known better.”  (App. at 102.)  The court concluded that it 
had taken into account “everything [Kulick] did with respect 
to the charges that were placed in this matter.”  (Id.)  We find 
that the District Court adequately considered all factors under 
Section 3553(a) at the sentencing hearing. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate judgment of 
sentence of the District Court and remand for further 
proceedings.  We find that the extortion offense was not 
relevant conduct to Kulick‟s unlawful possession of a firearm 
offense.  Accordingly, Kulick should be resentenced using a 
base offense level of 19, which corresponds to the unlawful 
possession of a firearm offense. 
